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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

uurisdicticn u

conferred on this court pursuant to Utah

Code Anr. §78-2a-3(2 . (c; ^ : • s53, as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
r.7-*-"3".-PC .'

< ': :

•: -.:uended) whereby a defendant in a

criminal action may take a:, appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
from a final judgment cf conviction of a Class B Misdemeanor by a
(

* :\

CJ.VIC:,...

.

-Z hand, final judgment and

.,'j: _ rendered by i.he Honorable Judge Sheila K.

r:cCleve, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake
< . *

*h.

GLEN A. COOK, #3710
Attorney for Plaintiff
Salt Lake City Prosecutors
451 South 200 East, #125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-535-7767
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, A
Municipal Corporation,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
CRIMINAL NO. 881003189MC
APPELLANT NO- 880550CA

vs.
GLEN SNYDER,
Defendant/Appellant.

CLASSIFICATION:
Priority 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant appellant Glen C. Snyder was convicted by a four
member jury on July 8, 1988, of one count of Destruction of
Property, a Class B misdemeanor.

Trial was held before a jury

sitting in the Third Circuit Court, the Honorable Sheila K.
McCleve, presiding.

Sentencing was held August 11, 1988.

Defendant was sentenced to six months incarceration and to pay
$214.78 in restitution.

Notice of Appeal was filed September 9,

1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to
upholding the jury verdict demontrate that:

1

Jury trial was held in this matter on July 8, 1/988. in

the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Ii i pretrial

—.~-^-_. T - • 1 y-* -xc ~ude any mention by

• u

prosecution witnesses or defendant's criminal record. (T a t: 1 ),
The judge refused to rule at that time, requiring defense counsel
t: o c h -; o c 4

:,::

* v • ""n :111 e r w a s b r o ached.

( T 1,2).

..ic incident charged in the present case occurred in the
late evening of April ?,, ] < '
Jam** -v ::

••

Dallas Mullins and a friend,

* ^- • — '

..r-u.-..-

State Street, Salt Lake Ci r

-.=J-I

^"-.- ""Pth Soutn and

: y ; y of t-.c AuaioTech store.

While they were parked, a black Cobra Mustang pulled diagonally
; ': - testified

^- '-

at trial uicit Glen Snyder, in*- uefendant, o „t cut of the Mustang
and "an toward trx- viot^Ti s ra: <inci tr^ed fie doer handle but: the
d-

.

h•

*v e

i

J

assailant kicxed the passenger dooi w- idi backing * e ca r
C

^aiias Mull ins tried

1 :• y > r c - hit a fin- hydrant.

•.-.••.

: ..-.,t

i

The assailant

' ^ : - h - • -•*

M

1

!

windshield glass v;,:.-> fractured, showering glass on James
Vansickle who was seated \- the passenger seat. (T 8 ) . On cross.. .

3t a ted rh •- y . -• *

ex.i,

«•

about

i .,. :;ute and that he did not kno.v the assailant'^ identity

prior ^"-. :s beino
t

. 3

-'-*'•:>•

* ook

t n w n i-le:i Snyder's driver's license picture

* ' *Sriydor

roc* tno stand i n h i s own defense and s t a t e d

t h e h<~ h - • : •- * • - <=- brother's car e a r l i e r that day but denied
be:; j

.;

^;.:^:.:

(

i

Oi I cross-examj i lation

Mr. Snyder admitted to a felony conviction.

(Record at 16).

Trial defense counsel did not object, move to strike, move for a
mistrial, or request a limiting instruction to the jury.
4.

The prosecution called the passenger of the car, James

VanSickle, as a rebuttal witness who corroborated Dallas Mullins'
testimony and identified Mr. Snyder in court as the perpetrator
of the car vandalism. (T 13).
5.

The prosecution witnesses did not discuss defendant's

criminal record. (T 1-14 and 22-27).
ISSUES
I.

Was trial defense counsel's motion limited to
introduction of defendant's prior conviction by
prosecution witnesses?

II.

Was the trial judge required to rule ±n limine on
defendantf s motion?

III. To avoid waiver, was trial defense counsel reqired to
object to cross-examination of defendant regarding his
prior conviction?
IV.

Was any error harmless?
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.
Defense counsel objected only to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses regarding defendant's criminal record. No
testimony was elicited from a prosecution witness regarding this
matter. The prior conviction was admitted to by defendant during
cross examination.
II. The trial judge was not required to rule ±n limine on
defendant's motion, but had the discretion to delay ruling.
III. Defense counsel failed to object to cross-examination
of the defendant regarding the conviction. Defense counsel did
not move to strike, did not ask for a mistrial, and did not even
ask for limiting jury instruction. Any error has been waived.
IV. Assuming that trial defense counsel's objection
included cross-examination and that he was not required to renew
the objection, any resulting
error was harmless. Two
individuals identified the defendant as the perpetrator. The
prior conviction was referenced only as a felony, avoiding any

confusion due to similarity of the crimes, and defendant did have
his testimony considered by the jury. There is not a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant.

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENSE COUNSEL OBJECTED ONLY TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES REGARDING DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL
RECORD. NO PROSECUTION WITNESS TESTIFIED AS TO
DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL RECORD.
It is clear from the record that trial defense counsel's
motion was not to exclude any reference to defendant's criminal
record, but only to prohibit such reference by prosecution
witnesses:
"I do have two motions, your Honor. One is to ask
that witnesses be excluded as is standard and the
second being that if the police officers or any
witnesses who might testify against Mr. Snyder have any
knowledge of his prior criminal record, that that be
excluded from being admitted in evidence." And again,
"What I would like would be a motion that he instruct
his witnesses not to go in that direction. Not to
bring it up on their own." (T 1, emphasis added).
Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) requires "a clear and
definite objection" at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for
appeal.

See State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982)

(decided under former Utah Rule of Evidence

4, a predecessor to

Rule 103). Trial defense counsel's objection did not encompass
all uses of the conviction.

It was directed only toward

prosecution witnesses.
Prosecution witnesses did not discuss defendant's prior
criminal record.

(T 1-14 and 22-27).

There was no error.

II.
THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO RULE IN LIMINE ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION.

Even if the plain language of defense counsel's motion could
be strained to include any mention of the criminal record,
defense counsel was directed to object at the time the statements
were elicited.
so.

(T 1 and 2 ) . Trial defense counsel failed to do

(T 16,28).
A trial judge has discretion to rule JLn limine or to await

developments at trial before ruling.

Rarely will a trial judge

be reversed for failing to rule in limine.

See U.S. v. York, 722

F.2d 715 (11th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Witschner, 624 F.2d 840 (8th
Cir. 1980).

The decision whether to rule in advance will often

turn on the judge's confidence or uncertainty concerning the
relationship of particular evidence as to the case as a whole.
Utah courts have recognized that, as a trial progresses, "the
judge often has a more complete view of the evidence and the
grounds for its suppression or admission than he or she does
before trial."

State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79,82 (Utah 1983);

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1985).

Indeed, some

courts have recommended that judges delay ruling on the scope of
impeachment until a witness testifies since the exact nature of
the testimony might be important in determining the scope of
impeachment.

See, U.S. v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082 (1st Cir.),

cert, denied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979).

Indeed, the instant case demonstrates the wisdom of delaying
a ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction.

Defense

counsel argues that in utilizing the criteria from State v.
Banner, 717 P.2d 125 (Utah 1986), the importance of the accused's
testimony would militate against admission of the conviction.
However, the importance of defendant's testimony would best be
determined after hearing the government's evidence.
To delay her ruling was well within the trial judge's
discretion.

The trial judge advised defense counsel that he

should object if the questioning went in that direction. (T 1,2).
Defense counsel did not do so. (T 16,28).
III.
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF DEFENDANT REGARDING DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL RECORD.
HAVING FAILED TO OBJECT, THERE IS WAIVER AND THE ISSUE
CANNOT BE RAISED ON APPEAL
Issues not raised before the trial court may not be raised
for the first time on appeal.

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799,

801 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Page, 762 P.2d 1113 (1988).
Defense counsel failed to object when his client was asked about
the previous felony conviction pursuant to URE 609.

He did not

move to strike after his client answered, even though the
prosecutor paused after eliciting the admission. See URE
103(a)(1). (Appellant brief at 4 ) . Defense counsel did not
request a mistrial and did not even ask for a limiting jury
instruction.

See State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (1988).

The principle underlying URE 103 f s requirement of a timely
objection is that the trial court should be given an opportunity
to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.

State v. Eldredge, 101 UAR 15 (Utah 1989);

See State v.

McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982) Utah Adv. Rep.

The

trial judge in the instant case was not given the chance to
utilize the above cited remedies.
IV.
ASSUMING INTRODUCTION OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION WAS
ERROR, SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS.
Even assuming that trial defense counsel's objection
included cross examination on the prior felony and that he was
not required to renew the objection, any resulting error was
harmless. Error is reversible "only if a review of the record
persuades the court that without the error there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant."

State

v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) quoting State v.
Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982).
In the instant case, two individuals with an excellent
opportunity to observe identified defendant as the perpetrator.
Further, the prior conviction was referenced only as "a felony"
(T at 16), thus avoiding any similarity between the prior crime
and the charged crime (State v. Banner, supra).

Additionally,

defendant's testimony was received and considered by the jury.
Id,

There is not a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable

result for the defendant.

CONCLUSION

the trial
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